






THE ICC’S SOUTH AFRICA NON-COMPLIANCE 
DECISION: EFFECT OF SECURITY COUNCIL 










On 6 July 2017, Pre-Trial Chamber II of the International Criminal Court (ICC) in the Al 
Bashir case, Darfur (Sudan) Situation, rendered a decision on South Africa’s refusal to arrest 
and surrender the sitting Sudanese President Omar Al Bashir to the ICC during his visit in 
June 2015.
1
 South Africa submitted that it is obliged to respect personal immunity of a Head 
of State embedded in customary law and it is under no obligation to cooperate.
2
 The Pre-





In fact, Sudan has not signed up to the Rome Statute. In 2005, the UN Security Council 
referred Sudan, Darfur Situation to the ICC through Resolution 1593.
4
 In Resolution 
1593(2005), the Security Council also decided that: 
‘the Government of Sudan and all other parties to the conflict in Darfur, shall 
cooperate fully with and provide any necessary assistance to the Court and the 
Prosecutor pursuant to this resolution and, while recognizing that States not party 
to the Rome Statute have no obligation under the Statute, urges all States and 
concerned regional and other international organizations to cooperate fully.’ 
5 
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The ICC in 2009 issued the first warrant of arrest for Al Bashir for the alleged war crimes 
and crimes against humanity during the Darfur conflict.
6
 The second warrant of arrest was 
issued in 2010 for his alleged genocide.
7
 After the issuance of the two warrants, Al Bashir has 
travelled to several States, including States that are parties to the Rome Statute, for instance, 
South Africa.
8
 The execution of the two warrants is still pending because States abstained 
from arresting him. Until now, the ICC has made several decisions for States Parties’ failure 




This note critically discusses the effect of Resolution 1593(2005) in three respects. Firstly, it 
briefly summaries different approaches adopted in the ICC about States Parties’ non-
compliance issues. Secondly, it evaluates the effect of Resolution 1593. Thirdly, it argues that 
Resolution 1593 cannot make Sudan participate in the ICC as if it were a party to the Statute.  
 
I. Different Approaches Adopted in the ICC 
 
The main issue before the ICC was how to remove the personal immunity of a sitting head 
of a non-party State, as Sudan is a State not party to the Rome Statute. Debates occur as to 
the legality of the issuance of warrants by the ICC and Al Bashir’s personal immunity 
embedded in traditional customary law. The ICC in previous decisions concerning Al Bashir 
has developed three divergent approaches.  
 
This first approach may be labelled as a ‘treaty-oriented’ approach because, in effect, it aims 
to apply Article 27(2) to Sudan. Pre-Trial Chamber I in the 2009 Arrest Warrant Decision 
tried to justify its issuance of the arrest warrant against Al-Bashir. One of its reasons was that 
Resolution 1593 on referring the Darfur Situation to the ICC implied the application of the 
whole framework of Rome Statute, including Article 27(2) stipulating that no immunity could 
be claimed before the ICC, to the Darfur situation.
10
   
 
The second approach could be called a ‘custom-oriented’ approach. In the 2011 Malawi and 
Chad Decisions,
11
 Pre-Trial Chamber I held that both States failed to comply with their 
                                                                    
6
 The Prosecutor v. Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir, Decision on the Prosecution’s Application for a 
Warrant of Arrest against Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir, ICC-02/05-01/09-3, PT.Ch.I, 4 March 
2009 (2009 Arrest Warrant Decision). 
7
 The Prosecutor v. Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir, Warrant of Arrest for Omar Hassan Ahmad Al 
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obligations to arrest Bashir because ‘the principle in international law is that immunity […] 
cannot be invoked to oppose a prosecution by an international court.’
12
 Meanwhile, a ‘critical 
mass’  had reached of ‘international community’s commitment to rejecting immunity’ in the 
context that international tribunals seek an arrest. A customary rule, therefore, exists 
providing an exception to the traditional customary rule on absolute personal immunity 




Lastly, in 2014 the DRC Decision did not follow the ‘custom-oriented’ approach as in the 
Malawi and Chad Decisions, but rather it adopted a ‘waiver’ approach that Bashir’s 
immunity was implicitly removed by Resolution 1593.
14
 The ICC has also adopted this 




In the 2017 South Africa Decision, the majority of Pre-Trial Chamber II does not rigidly 
adopt any of these approaches but introduces a variation of the ‘treaty-oriented’ approach.
16
 
The majority in the South Africa Decision heavily relies on Resolution 1593 to reach its 
conclusion. The main argument of this decision is that: 
‘the necessary effect of the Security Council resolution triggering the Court’s 
jurisdiction in the situation in Darfur and imposing on Sudan the obligation to 
cooperate fully with the Court, is that, for the limited purpose of the situation in 




Based on the idea that Resolution 1593 puts Sudan in the same position as a State Party to 
the Rome Statute, the Chamber explains that Article 27(2) applies to Sudan and no 
immunity issue has to be considered. It clarifies that the obligations and rights of Sudan are 
strictly limited to the Darfur situation. The majority of Pre-Trial Chamber II in its recent 
2017 Jordan Decision further affirmed this view.
18
 This reasoning, however, is controversial.  
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 The Prosecutor v. Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir, Decision under Article 87(7) of the Rome 
Statute on the non-compliance by Jordan with the request by the Court for the arrest and surrender 
of Omar Al-Bashir, ICC-02/05-01/09-309, PT.Ch.II, 11 December 2017, para. 37. 
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II. Effect of Resolution 1593(2005) on Referring the Darfur Situation to the ICC 
 
Firstly, the Security Council has the power to modify the territorial and personal jurisdiction 
of the ICC by referring a situation to the ICC under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. This 
power is explicitly conferred by the Rome Statute in accordance with its Article 13(b), thus, 
the ICC has jurisdiction over the Darfur situation by virtue of Resolution 1593. Both the 




Unlike the 2014 DRC Decision, the majority of the Pre-Trial Chamber in the South Africa 
Decision clarifies that no waiver is implied in Resolution 1593 as no immunity issue exists.
20
 
The majority does not analyse or interpret Resolution 1593 in the way that Judge Perrin de 
Brichambaut does in his minority opinion. Judge Perrin de Brichambaut examines the 
interpretation of Resolution 1593 by observing its ordinary meaning, context, object and 
purpose, statements by members of the Security Council and other UN Security Council’s 
resolutions, as well as subsequent practice of relevant UN organs and affected States. He 
concludes that a definite answer cannot be reached regarding the removal of Bashir’s 
immunity by virtue of Resolution 1593.
21
 Judge Perrin de Brichambaut insists on this view in 




Furthermore, although it is persuasive that Sudan is obliged to cooperate fully with the ICC 
based on Resolution 1593, the scope of this obligation is unclear, namely, whether it extends 
to a duty to waive Bashir’s immunity. As a matter of fact, an answer to this question does not 
directly assist Pre-Trial Chamber II in analysing South Africa’s obligation for Sudan’s non-
cooperation with the ICC to date.  
 
Lastly, a Security Council resolution might be considered as providing jurisdiction to an 
international criminal tribunal by relying on the 1948 Genocide Convention.
23
 This idea has 
been proposed by some commentators
24
 as well as the Amicus Curiae observation of the 
Helen Suzman Foundation.
25
 Judge Perrin de Brichambaut might be influenced by these 
proposals as he tries to establish a relationship between Articles IV and VI of the 1948 
Genocide Convention and the ICC as an ‘international penal tribunal’. He explains that 
immunity has been removed by Article IV of the Genocide Convention; consequently, as 
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Sudan and South Africa are contracting parties to the Genocide Convention the immunity 
issue before the ICC has been solved.  
 
However, debates among scholars indicate that apart from the fact that Sudan is a contracting 
party to the Genocide Convention, an acceptance of the ICC’s jurisdiction is required so as 
to link the Genocide Convention to the ICC.
 26
 The acceptance can be addressed through 
either other international law rules or a Security Council resolution. Until now, it is 
controversial to conclude that Resolution 1593 implies Sudan’s acceptance of jurisdiction of 
the ICC for alleged genocide against Bashir. In fact, Judge Perrin de Brichambaut does not 
consider the effect of Resolution 1593 in this respect.  
  
III. Can Resolution 1593 Make a Non-party State in a Position of a State Party? 
 
The last issue is whether the effect of Resolution 1593 temporarily makes Sudan a State 
Party. The majority gives a positive answer without providing any more convincing reasoning. 
As Pre-Trial Chamber II itself acknowledged, ‘this is an expansion of the applicability of an 
international treaty to a state which has not voluntarily accepted it as such.’ It is not the South 
Africa Decision that first regarded Sudan as a ‘State Party’ on the basis of Resolution 1593. 
The 2015 Sudan Decision has decided that by virtue of Resolution 1593, Sudan failed to 
comply with rules governing State Party cooperation.
27
 The court’s findings on the power of 
Resolution 1593 depart from the generally accepted principle of state consent to a treaty 
which it overcomes by citing the 1971 South West Africa ICJ Advisory Opinion; according 
to this ICJ case, the Security Council can impose obligations on States.
28
 Whilst the idea is 
uncontroversial, it does not help to justify such an expansive application.  
 
Additionally, commentators have not reached agreement on whether a binding Security 
Council resolution can effectively make a State Party to a treaty which it has not signed. Kreß 
claims that in the Darfur situation the Security Council has ‘placed Sudan in a position that is 
analogous to the position of a state party’.
29
 By contrast, Gaeta denies such a proposition.
30
 As 
Schabas notes, serving as a trigger mechanism under the Rome Statute, the Security Council 
has no more power than a State Party.
31
 The Security Council cannot transform a non-party 
State into a State Party, even if it issues a binding resolution imposing obligations on that 
State. Judge Perrin de Brichambaut finds that a firm answer cannot be given about the status 
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The ICC must also respect for provisions in international law in applying and interpreting 
law. Russian Federation had addressed in the Security Council meeting that: 
‘the obligation to cooperate, as set forth in resolution 1593 (2005), does not mean 
that the norms of international law governing the immunity of the Government 
officials of those States not party the Rome Statute can be repealed, and 
presuming the contrary is unacceptable.’
33
 
This statement, at least, shows that one of the five permanent members of the Security 
Council has not expected such an expansive effect of Resolution 1593. The majority’s 
construction of the effect of Resolution 1593 may strengthen the power of the Security 
Council in selectively referring situations concerning non-party States to the ICC. This 
circumstance is undesirable, which may either undermine the ICC’s situation referral 
mechanism or provoke severe criticisms of the ICC’s legitimacy. The 2017 South Africa 
Decision on the effect of Resolution 1593 would also stimulate further discussion on the 




In summary, the ICC adopted three main approaches to repudiate personal immunity of Al 
Bashir. The ‘treaty-oriented’ approach intends to apply Article 27(2) of the Rome Statute. 
This approach contains some variations with references to either Resolution 1593 or the 
Genocide Convention. The ‘custom-oriented’ approach relies on a modified customary rule 
to remove Al Bashir’s personal immunity. The ‘waiver’ approach claims that his personal 
immunity has been waived through Resolution 1593, which implicitly recognises the 
traditional customary rule respecting personal immunity. Decisions of the ICC are not in a 
consistent fashion in solving the personal immunity issue, which is still not moot. These 
different approaches also evidence the disagreement with regard to the effect of Resolution 
1593; such inconsistency in the ICC’s findings may undermine the predictability of its law. In 
the opinion of this author, the ICC is not an organ of the UN and therefore the effect of 
Security Council resolutions on the ICC should be interpreted restrictively so as to reduce 
the Security Council’s political influence on the ICC, thereby guaranteeing the ICC’s 
independence. The South Africa Decision is unconvincing when it concludes that Resolution 
1593 can render Sudan in a position of State Party to the Rome Statute.  
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